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Abstract
Background: ’Innovation’ has become a policy focus in its own right in many states as they compete to position
themselves in the emerging knowledge economies. Innovation in biomedicine is a global enterprise in which
‘Rising Power’ states figure prominently, and which undoubtedly will re-shape health systems and health
economies globally. Scientific and technological innovation processes and policies raise difficult issues in the
domains of science/technology, civil society, and the economic and healthcare marketplace. The production of
knowledge in these fields is complex, uncertain, inter-disciplinary and inter-institutional, and subject to a
continuing political struggle for advantage. As part of this struggle, a wide variety of issues - regulation, intellectual
property, ethics, scientific boundaries, healthcare market formation - are raised and policy agendas negotiated.
Methods: A range of social science disciplines and approaches have conceptualised such innovation processes.
Against a background of concepts such as the competition state and the developmental state, and national
innovation systems, we give an overview of a range of approaches that have potential for advancing understanding
of governance of global life science and biomedical innovation, with special reference to the ‘Rising Powers’, in order
to examine convergences and divergences between them. Conceptual approaches that we focus on include those
drawn from political science/political economy, sociology of technology; Innovation Studies and Science &
Technology Studies. The paper is part of a project supported by the UK ESRC’s Rising Powers programme.
Results: We show convergences and complementarities between the approaches discussed, and argue that the
role of the national state itself has become relatively neglected in much of the relevant theorising.
Conclusions: We conclude that an approach is required that enables innovation and governance to be seen as
‘co-producing’ each other in a multi-level, global ecology of innovation, taking account of the particular, differing
characteristics of different emerging scientific fields and technologies. We suggest key points to take account of in
order in the future to move toward a satisfactory integrative conceptual framework, capable of better
understanding the processes of the emergence, state steerage and transnational governance of innovative
biomedical sectors in the Rising Powers and global context.
Introduction
Biomedical innovation has become an accepted priority
in the industry policies of most of the advanced, devel-
oped societies. The emergence of a wide range of inno-
vative bio-industries, including the cell and tissue
therapies of regenerative medicine, molecular diagnos-
tics and genetic tests, biopharmaceuticals and medical
devices, takes place under conditions of globalisation.
The geopolitics of how biomedical innovation is and
should be governed at state, regional and transnational
levels is now an embedded feature of the bioeconomy.
With the rapid rise of, especially, China and India as
global players in the life sciences, the long-established
hegemony of the United States (US) in this field [1] is
being challenged, at least in terms of political intent,
with a consequent intensification of the struggle over
what forms of governance should be introduced by
whom, where, when and how. As a result, a new
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political dynamic is being created as states, multi-
national corporations and civil society organisations
compete for position in the existing and emerging gov-
ernance space of the biomedical knowledge economy.
In this paper, we provide an overview of several
strands of scholarship that bear on these issues in order
to elicit the primary dimensions which are necessary in
the future to go on to build a conceptual framework to
guide and inform debate about how best to analyse this
phenomenon. The aim is thus the relatively modest one
of identifying, describing, mapping and aligning a set of
relevant approaches, as a prelude to what would be a
further, new project in conceptual framework-building.
The focus is on the nexus between innovation and gov-
ernance at national, transnational and global levels, giv-
ing examples from the field of biomedicine. The
overview and discussion is organised under the topics
listed below. The first four sections provide a substan-
tive political science-based mapping of state-of-the-art
analytic approaches to understanding of the state poli-
tics of innovation and governance applying to global
biomedicine, and to the emerging global political
dynamic associated with the so-called Rising Powers
(examples being given broadly but with an emphasis on
India and China). This is followed by two sections pro-
viding an overview of relevant concepts and approaches
drawn from innovation studies and Science & Technol-
ogy Studies, which provide a complementary set of con-
cepts for investigating innovation-governance processes.
Attention is drawn to points at which these different
sets of concepts converge and overlap.
• States, politics and innovation
• States, politics, and multidimensional governance
of biomedical innovation
• States, politics and the transnational governance of
biomedical innovation
• The Rising Powers and hegemonic challenge in
biomedical innovation
• Innovation ecologies and pathways
• Co-production of innovation-governance; technolo-
gical zones as emerging sectors
• Conclusions: the conceptual challenge for global
biomedical innovation-governance
States, politics and innovation
In an analysis of the political economy of the develop-
ment of medicine, the competition for control of biome-
dical innovation governance is driven by the anticipated
demand of future populations for improved and more
efficient healthcare, the future knowledge market gener-
ated by this demand and the economic benefits that will
accrue to those able to shape access to that market to
their advantage. In this context, the approach adopted
by states to innovation governance forms an integral
part of political ambition.
In general terms, the advanced economies of North
America and Europe met the uncertainties accompany-
ing the shift from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of mass
production and consumption with evolution of the
‘competition’ state as the vehicle for the pursuit of
national advantage through innovation [2-4]. Rather
than concerning themselves with government interven-
tions to ensure full employment and respond to market
failures, states began to focus their attention instead on
the neo-liberal supply-side policies that would give a
sharp edge to their competitiveness in the global knowl-
edge economy. Particularly in the case of the knowledge
driven bio-industries, this meant a concentration not
only on the infrastructures of innovation but also on
‘agglomeration and network economies and the mobili-
sation of social as well as economic sources of flexibility
and entrepreneurialism’ [5]. To be effective as players in
the global economy, it was argued, competition states
needed to bring their social and cultural values into line
with their entrepreneurial ambitions. Entrepreneurialism
needed to be embedded: as a consequence the institu-
tional reforms of the competition state eschewed rigid
bureaucratic hierarchies and relied instead on new
forms of network based governance [6,7].
In deciding how to intervene and with what policies,
this form of analysis has shown that competition states of
the West have moved away from the national sponsor-
ship of particular firms and technologies and towards
policies designed to foster ‘the conditions necessary for
innovation’, although this model is challenged by the
recent credit crisis impacting on infrastructure invest-
ments. In common with innovation theorists, they recog-
nise that the concept of a self-contained national
innovation system is no longer tenable either empirically
or as a policy objective. Hence, the goal has become less
one of specific structural change and more one of stimu-
lating a dynamic that enables the knowledge production
process to become self-sustaining. It has become part of
the established policy orthodoxy that regional (sub-
national or trans-national) governments should initiate
programmes to foster cluster developments in sectors
such as biotechnology [8]; that commercialisation can be
facilitated through academic-industry collaborations and
high profile, publicly funded R & D centres acting as
magnets for venture capital investment [9-11]; that net-
works of science and industry should be enabled; that
regulation should be facilitative rather than restrictive
[12]; and that intellectual property rights (IPR) should
favour the operation of the market. In this conceptual
approach, as with all orthodoxies, there is the expectation
of policy convergence between states characterised by
assumptions regarding ‘best practice’ in the field [13].
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Not all governments adopted this competition state
model in response to the challenges of globalisation.
Shaped by a different historical experience and lacking
the scientific critical mass and innovation infrastructures
of competition states, the states of the developing world
chose a different approach. Focusing in the main on
South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and to some extent Singa-
pore, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the earlier work on
the ‘developmental state’ highlights its role in the pro-
motion of rapid economic development through the tar-
geting of particular industries with large global markets.
The markets were already there. The political task was
to penetrate them. To achieve this goal, the state pro-
tected its chosen industries using a range of policies
such as import and credit controls, promoted them
through state investment, guided private capital through
incentive schemes, and measured their progress in
terms of export achievements [14-16]. Backed by a
strong, professional and autonomous bureaucracy, the
state sought to define the specific path of industrialisa-
tion through the ‘government of the market’ [17,18].
In this analysis, the essence of those states’ commonal-
ity is that they sought to challenge the control exercised
by the developed world over the dynamic of globalisa-
tion. If they were to access the wealth of global markets,
if they were to ‘catch up’ with Western countries, then
the power of the state was required to make globalisa-
tion work for them. However, having caught up using
the targeting of known markets as a primary policy
objective, developmental states face the problem of
‘keeping up’ in the context of future markets like the life
sciences that are either unknown or decidedly uncertain
[19]. Like competition states, they are conceived to be
obliged to adapt their strategies in the light of both
threats and opportunities in the international economy
[20]. This approach highlights that they are also aware
that, in the case of biomedicine and the life sciences in
general, that their traditional modes of direct state inter-
vention do not suit the innovation requirements of what
is an elusive science with a speculative future, an uncer-
tain market and a difficult path to commercialisation.
As we shall see in later sections, nascent and emerging
technological sectors and zones tend to manifest their
own particular characteristics and governance require-
ments. As a consequence, observers taking a political
economy perspective have noted the evolution of devel-
opmental state governance into new forms described
variously as the ‘adaptive state’, the ‘flexible state’, the
‘post-industrial developmental state’, the ‘transformative
state’ and the ‘catalytic state’ in their studies of Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan [21-23]. As Wong observes of
biotechnology in Taiwan, it is a case of the state identi-
fying ‘the right mix of public policies aimed at facilitat-
ing technology innovation and knowledge-based
interventionist strategies’ and recognising that ‘cutting
edge technologies can no longer be borrowed; rather
they must be created’ - which means a change in state
direction and an investment in, or access to, basic
science [[24]: 169-70]. In moving from borrowers to
innovators, this view focuses attention on how develop-
mental states are obliged to review the extent of their
autonomy and the style of the bureaucracy that imple-
ments their policies.
States, politics and multidimensional governance
of biomedical innovation
The implications of the complexities of innovation for
the role of the state in the governance of biomedical
knowledge production are considerable, as we explore in
more detail later in the paper, drawing on innovation
studies and STS theory. States have a wide range of pol-
icy choices regarding the point and mode of interven-
tion in this process in terms of the science itself, society
and the future market. Precisely what policies should be
introduced to support a state’s ambition is not clear and
will be driven in part by how they seek to position
themselves within the global value chain of innovation
and in part by the level of development of the sector or
zone. For novel fields of biomedicine, the knowledge
production process from the basic science, through clin-
ical experimentation and trials, to the therapeutic pro-
duct is long, arduous and uncertain. At all stages in that
process, there exists a potential triangle of tensions that
can be summarised as being between science, society
and the market [25]: the science may prove to be inade-
quate, society unsympathetic or the market uninterested.
As a result there is pressure for governance to be ‘co-
produced’ with science in response to these tensions. As
Jasanoff puts it, this means a focus on how ‘knowledge
making is incorporated into practices of state-making,
or of governance more broadly, and in reverse, how
practices of governance influence the making and use of
knowledge’ [26]. Thus, the chosen mode of governance
can be critical in determining the success or failure of
the biomedical innovation. This key dynamic and the
conceptual approach that represents it is discussed in
more detail below, in the sections on Innovation ecolo-
gies and Co-production.
If innovation policy is to be successful, this triangle of
tensions highlights the following crucial dynamics. First,
choices about the science have much to do with the
creation and husbanding of the resources necessary for
the enterprise to have an explicit domestic platform.
This may require investment, an adequate research
funding market and an appropriate supply of scientific
labour and research materials such as oocytes and stem
cell lines. Secondly, regardless of political system, the
response of society to biomedical science, for example as
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mobilised through civil society organisations or in the
formation of ethical positions, may require choices to be
made about how that response is negotiated both
domestically and internationally if public trust in the
field is to be maintained. As we discuss below, public
expectations and imagined futures play a potent role in
the progress a given area of science or emerging sector
may or may not make. Even if, as in China, the public
voice is muted, both elite and international opinion
nonetheless act to request, if not require, policies that
regulate the science in the public interest - not only in
terms of risk and safety but also the sensitivities of cul-
tural values. Without such policies, future consumer
demand may be fatally undermined. Thirdly and finally,
the risk of market failure during the long gestation from
basic science to eventual therapy means that early gov-
ernment funding intervention may be necessary to moti-
vate patenting, venture capital investment and
pharmaceutical engagement in this emerging industry.
To simplify a complex set of institutional positions, for
countries such as the UK, it is primarily the state which
is seen as the appropriate agent for interventions in the
innovation process with private interests playing a rela-
tively lesser role, whereas in the case of the US, this
equation may be reversed in many, though not all, bio-
medical sectors.
At the same time, the perspective demonstrated in the
above discussion strongly indicates that if the construc-
tion of global advantage by a state is the goal, it must
recognise that: (a) the national-regional levels of govern-
ance play different and potentially complementary roles;
(b) direct public intervention may be counterproductive
and at the very least needs to be matched by indirect
policies aimed at stimulating private sector involvement;
and (c) private governance e.g. (organised self-regulation
by producers via voluntary codes of practice and stan-
dards) is a necessary part of the policy package. What is
being described here is of course a form of multi-level
governance where the dispersion of governance across
several jurisdictions has the assumed advantage that it is
more flexible than the concentration of governance in
the one jurisdiction of the central state [[27]: 235].
Against this advantage has to be set the possible trans-
action costs of coordinating multiple jurisdictions,
should this prove necessary. In addition, not all of these
jurisdictions may be responsive to state suggestions. The
expansion of private governance as a result of the com-
plexities of scientific advance and the need for continu-
ous technical and ethical rule making has established a
realm of governance with its own networks, authorities,
and procedures [28-31].
The combination of the ‘triangle of tensions’ with
multiple levels of governance leads to an initial frame-
work for a structural and process analysis of innovation
governance, which is outlined in our Conclusion, below.
Having focused in this section on the broad dimensions
of a governance analysis, the following section now
focuses upon the transnational nature of the govern-
ance space that competition states and the Rising
Powers must build and inhabit.
States, politics and the transnational governance
of biomedical innovation
The competition between states for advantage in the
transnational markets that constitute the global infra-
structure of biomedical knowledge production (research
funding, scientific labour, moral economy, intellectual
property and VC finance) takes place within a complex
and very fluid transnational governance and regulatory
space that has the capacity to direct, steer or ignore the
operation of these innovation markets. It is in the politi-
cal interest of states to seek to shape that transnational
governance space in ways that enhance the synergistic
engagement of the markets with their own national
innovation strategies.
As we explore in detail in the next section, the politi-
cal economy perspective highlights how national states
will bring quite different historical perspectives to bear
on the question of where and how to intervene in the
transnational governance space of biomedical innova-
tion. For states of the developed world it is likely to be
in their best interest to support governance measures
that reinforce the model of innovation that has served
them well in the past. For the developing economies, on
the other hand, approaches to innovation based on their
particular strengths and weaknesses will lead them to
influence transnational governance in a different direc-
tion. Commenting on the ‘sclerotic’ qualities of the
established drug innovation model traditionally spon-
sored by the US and European Union, Tait observes of
China and India that ‘these increasingly powerful com-
ponents of the bioeconomy may see a competitive
advantage in leading regulatory reform so as to encou-
rage more innovative health care sectors to develop,
initially for their large and increasingly wealthy home
markets, and perhaps also to encourage change in the
United States and European regulatory systems’ [32].
Given their global ambition, China and India must also
target the apparatus of transnational governance.
In so doing, they are faced with a wide range of possi-
ble points of intervention in the governance space,
which includes formal international institutions, intergo-
vernmental agreements, self-regulatory or private
regimes, combined public/private networks, and what
Coleman terms ‘loose couplings’ of allied interests on
particular issues [33]. In some cases the apparatus of
governance is highly developed, institutionalized, and
underpinned and legitimised by international legal
Salter and Faulkner Globalization and Health 2011, 7:3
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/7/1/3
Page 4 of 14
agreement. In others it consists of a transnational net-
work that contributes to the process of ‘governance
without government’ through non-hierarchical forms of
steering by private actors and the creation of non-state
forms of political order [34-37]. As Rosenau describes
the contribution of such a network, ‘Here governance is
conceived as systems of rule, as the purposive activities
of any collectivity that sustain mechanisms designed to
insure its safety, prosperity, coherence, stability and con-
tinuance’ [[38]: 171]. It is what he terms a ‘horizontal
network’ with authority embedded in the informal rules
through which it conducts its affairs [[38]: 191]. Such is
the variety of the types of governance that can inhabit
and interact in the transnational space of global activ-
ities that a tendency is produced toward governance
that is both multidirectional and a mixture of formal
and informal structures ‘in which the dynamics of gov-
ernance are so intricate and overlapping among the sev-
eral levels as to form a singular, web-like process that...
neither begins nor culminates at any level or at any
point of time’ [39]. This form of governance coincides
with the transnational character of technology innova-
tion which, as is discussed below, readily flows across
national jurisdictions. This principle is also shown in
Science & Technology Studies approaches to standardi-
sation and ‘portability’ of innovative scientific knowl-
edge, a point of conceptual convergence in the
approaches that we illustrate in this paper. This is dis-
cussed further in the sections below dealing with inno-
vation ecologies and the concept of the co-production
of innovation and governance.
For those engaged in the competition for future posi-
tion in biomedical innovation, these many points of pos-
sible intervention are not neutral arenas of dispassionate
governance debate but political sites where alliances are
formed in order to protect and further particular inter-
ests. For example, the development of a transnational
form of patenting governance through the Agreement
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
has been characterised by a continuing conflict between
the interests of developed and developing world states.
It is inevitable that states at different stages of economic
development and consequently with their own particular
approaches to the exploitation of the innovation value
chain will place different political demands on global
patenting governance. As a form of transnational gov-
ernance in biomedical innovation, TRIPS is character-
ized by its international legal status as a vehicle for
multi-level governance to standardize the operation of
the market, the legitimizing power of the WTO, bureau-
cratic complexity, and continuing and highly visible
political conflict. A contrasting example of transnational
governance is provided by the work of the International
Stem Cell Forum, established by the UK Stem Cell Bank
(UKSCB) as a vehicle for standardization in stem cell
science [40]. Here we have a private, non-government,
mode of network governance, motivated by the desire of
science for a form of self-regulation that will enhance its
capacity to operate transnationally. As noted in the pre-
vious paragraph, the important issue of standardization
as a mode of non-governmental governance is one of
the points of alignment between political science
approaches and those from Innovation Studies and
Science and Technology Studies (STS).
The Rising Powers and hegemonic challenge in
biomedical innovation
This section now turns to consider the political econ-
omy perspective as applied specifically to the substantive
issue of the US position in the global bioeconomy, and
the Rising Powers’ strategic response to this. The drive
by some developing countries to establish a governance
platform for a competitive entry into the global biome-
dical economy collides with the reality of US hegemony
in the model and practice of biomedical innovation.
America’s powerful mix of federal, state and private
funding for biomedical science resonates easily with its
dominant model of how the governance of innovation
in the biotechnology industry facilitates the movement
from basic science to commercial product: a model that
the US has propagated energetically on the global stage
[25]. It assumes a strong and established infrastructure
of scientific research supported by a clear market
emphasis on the facilitation of a close engagement
between academy and industry in order to provide ideo-
logical and practical support for research applications
[41,42]. The US state created a permissive patenting
regime with the capacity to support and enhance its
ambitions for a global biomedical industry [43]. As a
result, university technology transfer offices in the US
focus on helping their scientists to patent their findings,
identify private investment opportunities and negotiate
advantageous intellectual property agreements with their
scientific partners in developing countries [44]. Such is
the power of the US model of biotech innovation that it
enables the US easily to sustain its position when mea-
sured on all the primary indicators of innovation capa-
city in this field: R and D investment, concentration of
research, scientific workforce, experimental trials by
SMEs, supporting IP laws, venture capital investment
and potential healthcare market [1,25].
In seeking to challenge the US hegemony, develop-
mental states have had to adapt their modus operandi
to the needs of an uncertain knowledge market [45,46]
and to move towards what have been described as ‘ecol-
ogies of innovation’ (see below). The precise mode of
adaptation varies and is dependent on local political
conditions, a realistic assessment of their innovation
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strengths and weaknesses, the regional context, and
decisions regarding the strategic entry points on the bio-
technology value chain of innovation that a state deems
appropriate [47]. In Singapore, the state retains tight
control in its pursuit of economic prosperity through
the promotion of the biomedical industry. It remains a
single party state with a high level of state ownership
that still prohibits public demonstrations, exercises a
tight labour control scheme, and limits public debate
[48]. Yet at the same time its bureaucracy has adapted
itself in order to ‘enable’ the emergence of its health
technology economy by providing research facilities,
funding, and a supportive regulatory climate responsive
to international requirements [49]. It may have moved
towards a more liberal economy, but on the state’s
terms. Contrast this with the situation in Taiwan where,
in the promotion of biotechnology, the earlier cohesive
bureaucracy has been replaced by a proliferation of gov-
ernment agencies characterised by overlapping and com-
peting jurisdictions [24]. Or again, South Korea where
the growth of working class and bourgeoisie opposition
combined with the divisions between the chaebol (family
controlled corporate groups) and the state to reduce the
traditional autonomy of the latter [50,51]. Nonetheless,
despite their considerable differences, all three develop-
mental states have taken the view that their national
innovation strategies on health biotechnology should
form part of a larger, global enterprise. With the effects
of the WTO’s initiatives on international economic gov-
ernance feeding through the global system, developmen-
tal states are obliged to be proactive in their approach
to globalisation regardless of their earlier leanings
towards protectionism.
The Rising Powers of China and India, as relatively
recent emerging economies, bring a different perspective
to the developmental state approach as a means for
achieving geopolitical advantage. Unlike Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, they did not experience
the rapid economic growth of the 1980s and early
1990s. For China, the massive shift from a centrally
planned to a market-influence economy that com-
menced in 1978 required a seismic change in the role of
the state that only gathered real momentum in the mid-
1990s. Membership of the WTO and exposure to the
pressures of global competition in the early 1990s
caused what Saich has described as ‘the internationalisa-
tion of the reform process’ and an intensification of
demands for the state to move from a directive to a
facilitative role [[52]:4]. In practice, although the level of
administrative intervention has diminished, the state in
China for example has retained many of its old monopoly
functions whilst simultaneously expanding its role into
the new regulatory policy arenas needed to participate
effectively in the global knowledge economy [52-54].
Its infrastructure needs as a player in this economy
remain considerable and it is still in important respects
playing ‘catch up’ [55]. India, meanwhile, is a revealing
example of a country that initially took the traditional
developmental state path but, by the early 1990s, had
clearly failed to meet its economic objectives [56,57].
With impressive adaptability, the Indian state subse-
quently reconstructed itself as the enabling vehicle for a
deregulated economy that has produced the explosive
growth of the last 15 years [58,59].
The degree of adaptability of developmental states is a
critical political factor in their response to the economic
possibilities of biomedical innovation [60] because it
must acknowledge the fluidity of that phenomenon be it
expressed through technological sectors, zones or net-
works (see section below, Co-production). Lacking the
resources to compete for global advantage across the
full range of policy components that shape the knowl-
edge production process in this field, developmental
states must necessarily be selective, choosing their
points of policy intervention in the light of their
strengths and weaknesses and consequently how they
seek to position themselves in the global game. As the
World Bank report China and the knowledge economy:
seizing the 21st century observes, ‘developing countries
do not have to reinvent the wheel: there are many ways
for them to tap into and use the knowledge created in
developed countries’ [55]. In this respect a state’s terri-
torial jurisdiction of knowledge is less important than its
strategic capacity for global access to the components of
knowledge production.
Innovation ecologies and pathways
In this section, having reviewed and illustrated state-of-
the-art political economy understanding of the competi-
tive nation-state politics of biomedical innovation under
globalisation, we turn to a review of concepts from
innovation studies and Science & Technology Studies
(STS), to see how they can link with and contribute to
developing an understanding of both state and non-state
dynamics in shaping innovation and governance trajec-
tories in the biomedical field. As we show, there are a
number of key convergences between the political
economy-based conceptual analysis illustrated above and
those now to be discussed. These convergences can be
seen most obviously in the analysis of the ‘modular’
model of innovation. Various concepts have been and
are being used to understand scientific, industrial, and
technological innovation processes, in a vast and diverse
set of literatures in innovation studies and STS. These
concepts tend to be generic, in the sense that they are
not derived from observation of trends in the realpolitik
of inter-national innovation/governance and states’ rela-
tionships in the way that the previous sections of this
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paper have discussed. Many of the approaches owe
some of their origins to evolutionary economics, and
many of them have a tendency to position the govern-
ance work of the state as one of a variety of ‘institu-
tional’ actors which are typically conceived of as lying
outside innovation processes themselves. However, these
‘institutional’ factors have now been recognised as
requiring further research attention amongst innovation
studies scholars.
Relevant concepts from innovation studies include:
sectoral innovation systems; technological systems;
sociotechnical systems; technological regimes; and tech-
nological paradigms. The long-established concept of
‘national innovation system’ [61] does focus on national
processes, having been used to show, for example, how
the nature and degree of national state coordination of
the development of biotechnology varied between the
UK, US and Japan [62]. The sectoral systems approach
in contrast ‘places emphasis on the role of non-firm
organizations such as universities, financial institutions,
government, local authorities and of institutions and
rules of the games such as standards, regulations, labor
markets and so on’. As Malerba [63] notes, these differ
greatly in their configuration across sectors, and affect
the ‘innovative, and productive activities of firms’. Not-
ing that the understanding of ‘institutions’ effect on sec-
toral innovation is in its infancy, Malerba [64] has
outlined future directions for research that should high-
light public policy interventions which shape the growth
and transformation of sectoral systems processes. The
concept of sector obviously extends beyond nation-state
boundaries, and variation in ‘rules of the game’ between
different sectors has important implications for states
and others’ governance strategies. The articulation
between state political strategies and sectoral dynamics
is thus a key point of convergence between the different
approaches discussed here, where further systematic
conceptual development remains to be undertaken.
The definition of ‘technological system,’ has been sta-
ted to be a ‘network of agents interacting in specific
economic/industrial area under a particular institutional
infrastructure...’ [65]. On the other hand, the concept of
‘technological regimes’ [66-69] has been developed as
being more explicitly technology-oriented and more
concerned with knowledge and learning, taking as its
focus the possibilities that a technology’s actors envision
as feasible in the development of a technology, and
highlighting the ease with which knowledge can be
shared - partly dependent on the extent to which it is
tacit or codified [69]. This approach distinguishes
especially between ‘science-based’ and ‘cumulative’ tech-
nologies and highlights the perspective of the entrepre-
neurial firm. This distinction is of clear importance in
examining different strands of biomedical innovation,
for example in contrasting the biotech (science) and
medical device (cumulative) sectors. Thus here we have
conceptual approaches that seek to understand the
dynamics of discrete technologies as packages of knowl-
edge, expertise and labour associated with their own
individual dynamics. These concepts can be positioned
as complementary to the foregoing political economy
analysis of governance strategies for supporting the con-
ditions of innovation, by providing a focus on partly his-
torical characteristics of technologies and emergent
sectors themselves. Such characteristics must be under-
stood by any nation state seeking competitive or colla-
borative advantage through enterprise and regulatory
policymaking.
In contrast to these systems-oriented concepts, ‘ecol-
ogy’ has been used as a metaphor in a variety of fields
related to scientific innovation and medicine in order to
capture the complexity, contingency, and indeterminacy
associated with the process of knowledge production or
technology development and diffusion [70,71]. Thus,
important work in innovation systems analysis applied
to medical technology innovation has conceptualised
innovation in this way [72], moving towards a more
plural, polycentric and interactive view of medical scien-
tific innovation, as well as demonstrating empirically the
distributed nature of biomedical innovation networks as
they shift and evolve over time and place, involving
scientific and practical knowledge that cuts across estab-
lished boundaries of expertise and nation-state [73,74].
These analyses are important in showing interactions
between actors in healthcare systems such as clinicians
and actors in innovative biomedical science, thus draw-
ing attention to the crucial issue of the mechanisms of
translation from innovation process to health system.
The ecological metaphor draws attention to the ‘spaces’
and boundaries of biomedical science - their complex-
ities, pathways, and disruptive influences - allowing
exploration of how global innovation works on different
levels at particular sites, be they laboratories, regions or
transnational networks [75,76]. Such a perspective on
innovation processes can thus provide for an ecological
approach to the interpenetrating levels, links and scales
of analysis required to understand the practices of glo-
balised innovation processes, and thus the multi-level
and multidimensional governance issues that they pre-
sent and with which they interact, which were described
in the political economy sections of this discussion.
It is thus necessary to build on concepts like these
that enable concepts of innovation and of governance to
be linked together. In STS, a number of concepts that
indicate recursiveness or ‘mutual constitution’ have
come to the fore. In particular, the concept of co-
production is now widely used. This broadbrush concept
can be seen as underlying much of the discussion in the
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previous sections. It is of course used in a variety of dif-
ferent ways and embraces a variety of different co-
producing entities, though typically these are ‘technology’
or ‘science’, and ‘society’. Jasanoff [26] in a foundational
statement of the co-production ‘idiom’, identifies two
phenomena in particular that we take to be of particular
value in addressing biomedical innovation and govern-
ance under globalisation: first, the ‘emergence and stabili-
sation’ of objects and practices, such as scientific
knowledge and technological products; second, ‘intellig-
ibility and portability’, which we can take to refer to com-
municability and standardisation, and methods and tools
that can provide credibility as ‘objects and practices’ cir-
culate between different sites and cultures (and, we can
add - nation states). Here, we can note the applicability
of such concepts to the analysis of transnational govern-
ance presented above, for example in the case of TRIPS,
where common methods of commoditising and valuing
knowledge products have been formed through political
negotiation.
Closely related to the concepts of emergence and sta-
bilisation of new sectors, and the boundary-crossing
standardisation of knowledge and technologies, are a
family of STS concepts with a focus more on how tech-
nologies develop and change, focused noticeably around
notions that can be summarised as momentum and cri-
tical mass. These include concepts such as: technology
transitions, path dependence, lock-in, and ‘emerging
irreversibilities’. The basic principle here is that innova-
tive biomedical technologies may follow distinctive inno-
vation pathways as they emerge, and thus that they may
be amenable to different forms of governance interven-
tion and steerage. Technologies may pass a point of no
return - ‘irreversibility’ [77] due to path dependence and
lock-in [78], when new practices become built-in to
practitioner communities. Thus here again, we can iden-
tify a concept that is applied in a technology-specific
way which is complementary to the more generic multi-
level, multi dimensional political economy described in
previous sections. Such complex governance strategy
must take account of more ‘grass-roots’ or niche-level
individual science or technology dynamics.
Innovation pathways have also been shown to be
shaped by actors’ expectations, visions and imagined
futures [79]. Expectations ‘drive technical and scientific
activity, warranting the production of measurements,
calculations, material tests, pilot projects and models’
[80]. Expectations can be intrinsic to the standardisation
processes highlighted in the idiom of co-production, for
example, formulating an expectation about the useful-
ness of a tool or a procedure, can amount to an implicit
guide to others to adopt it - an example of portability in
action. Expectations may have their own trajectories
[81]. As Brown notes, expectations may be at their most
powerfully path-shaping in the early stages of technolo-
gical development, though they may also be subject to
de-stabilisation, for example through the promotion of
counter-visions or resistance from potential users, con-
sumers, patients or citizens. Thus states, whether they
be developmental or competition states, which are grap-
pling with biomedical innovation policy, have the oppor-
tunity to consider what forms of strategic intervention
they might make in supporting particular visions of
bioscientific and technology development as part of
‘techno-national’ projects, and may shape strategies in
terms of the particular timing of intervention in the cru-
cial, path-defining early stages of scientific-technological
innovation processes.
A key feature of future-oriented visions that is key to
the development of a new biomedical technology or
product is the clinical usership [82] constituted in the
health system. Various studies have shown the crucial
importance of the link between producers and users in
shaping new technological developments, for example in
diagnostic and imaging technology [83]. This has been
formulated as a general insight important to the shaping
of innovation trajectories: ‘processes bridging the medi-
cal supply industry and the communities of medical
practitioners’ [84]. ‘Configuring the users’ - see [85] for
example - is thus a key part of the active shaping of
emerging technologies, zones, sectors and markets,
hence the importance of the dynamic between users and
producers (user-producer interaction and upstream
engagement) in shaping the evolving innovation path-
way. State institutions also may have a role in this con-
figuring work, as has been demonstrated in the case of
inter-national state vaccine policies [86,87].
In summary, this section has shown that there are a
range of valuable concepts produced in innovation stu-
dies and STS that should be set alongside a political
economy analysis of state strategies in the context of glo-
bal multilevel, multidimensional governance. Many of
these concepts are especially useful in pointing to the
individual character of emerging fields or technologies, of
which state strategies must take account. Our discussion
now turns to consider a second strand of conceptual ana-
lysis from STS, namely the idea of co-production, which
we develop in terms of understanding the emergence of
new - biomedical - fields.
Co-production of innovation-governance:
technological zones and governation
The previous section has shown that a key concept in
approaching science and technology innovation under
globalisation is that of ecology. It also introduced the
crucial topic of emerging, sectoral, standardisable and
portable innovations and the importance of actors’
expectations and visions of usership as sociotechnical
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domains where states can, and do, intervene. In this sec-
tion, the processes of emergence of new fields such as
those of biomedicine, and the possibilities of their gov-
ernance, are focused on in more detail. In globalisation
theory, emerging forms of national state-global govern-
ance have been characterised as ‘multi-scalar’ [88], and
the notion of ‘nodal governance’ [89] points in the same
direction. These formulations too are essentially ecologi-
cal concepts, thus the concept of ecology can be
extended to apply also to governance, that is, the
extended, multi-actor, multi-node, ‘modular’, network
governance that is emerging globally, though, as the
foregoing analysis of the Rising Powers and develop-
mental states has shown, unevenly in different states and
biomedical sectors. This approach highlights structural
concepts of levels of governance activity, the identifica-
tion of the more or less heterogeneous range of salient
actor networks for given knowledge/technology
domains, and aspects of the size and intensiveness of
governance actors and activity. In other words, such
overarching ecological notions allow a conceptualisation
encompassing elements both of ‘level’ of governance
activity (e.g. micro practice/meso institution/macro pol-
icy - [90]) and the geographically distributed interaction
of multiple innovation-governance actors in the global
political economy. In the case of biomedicine such geo-
graphies include, for example bioregions (e.g. Singapore)
and transnational actors, as well as the nation state
dynamics that we have illustrated.
A key element in such strategies is the need for an
awareness of the emergence of new ‘sectors’ and their
steerage by nation states in interaction with transna-
tional entities in the context of the global innovation
landscape. In this context, a constructionist social theory
perspective supports the insight that regulatory govern-
ance is one key driver that contributes to the defining of
the boundaries of scientific and technological jurisdic-
tions which can be supported, funded, structured, orga-
nised, standardised, contested and governed by the state.
This insight is somewhat neglected in innovation studies
[91]. An under-specification of the innovative, construc-
tive aspects of regulatory work can be seen, for example,
in the theorisation of sectoral systems of innovation and
production referred to above [63]. In the case of the
European Union polity, for example, it has been argued
that ‘the EU’s governance blend... requires... domains to
be constituted in order that they may be governed’
[[92]: 146]. Novel, hybrid and combinatorial technolo-
gies present policy with the need to alter the boundaries
between existing institutional arrangements and devise
new administrative units. Economic and political inter-
ests are of course integral to the formation of such
domains and are likely to be the object of conflict
between sectoral and national state interests, as has
been the case with controversy over TRIPS for example,
as noted above. A study of such multi-level conflictual
processes of negotiation of regulatory and innovation
policy can afford insights into the formation of the rules
of engagement for emerging technology zones or sec-
tors. Jurisdictional boundaries, such as define the scope
of a technology (e.g. ‘tissue engineering’) or a govern-
ance domain (e.g. ‘enterprise’ or ‘public health’) can be
difficult to establish in political processes, reflecting con-
flicting framings of economically important emerging
zones.
The jurisdictional fields of technology, knowledge and
productiveness that regulation attempts to define can
usefully be conceptualised as ‘zones’ (following Barry
[93,94]). The fluid patchwork of regulation interacts
with the negotiation of technological zones, driven by
various interests and actors. For example, Europe as a
trade area itself is partly constituted by regulatory and
standard-setting activity: ‘...technological zones are the
objects of developing forms of transnational regulation’
[93]. Such zones themselves are partly the product of
the work of regulatory policymaking and the active
application of regulatory standards. Policy for technical
standardisation is a sine qua non of the formation of
technological zones [95]. The example of the UK’s Stem
Cell Bank noted above is a good example of such an
initiative. By highlighting the embryonic status of emer-
ging technological fields and nascent industries, the con-
cept of technological zone is able to focus on this
upstream, stakeholder and state-orchestrated regime-
building work that shapes the rules of engagement of an
emergent field [82]. At this point, we can note a strong
convergence with the concept of a ‘horizontal network’
of informal rules which flow across national jurisdic-
tions, discussed in our section above on transnational
governance [38]. Recognised sectors with established
institutional and politico-economic status, such as trade
associations, often themselves act as powerful stake-
holders in negotiations that construct and shape the
pathway of the newly emerging technological zones, and
which must find some form of articulation simulta-
neously with a multitude of national state manoeuvrings
[82].
The definition of a technological zone has some flex-
ibility - for example, it may or may not be commensu-
rate with a political territory, be it a nation state or
other form or level of jurisdiction. Zones, it has been
argued, make association between participants possible
but also create new distinctions and separations. In Bar-
ry’s terms they are ‘spaces of circulation in which tech-
nologies take more or less standardised forms’ [[93]:
122], and in which intellectual property implies new
‘objects of technical practice’. Political actors such as
states have a role in drawing and legitimating these
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boundaries and entry criteria. The definition of the
‘scope’ of an emerging technology or technological pro-
duct, as can be accomplished through new legislation,
can be an integral action in the standardisation and sta-
bilisation of a new zone such as those appearing in bio-
medicine, such as medical nanotechnology. Key actors,
including state institutions, seek to stabilise emerging
fields through processes such as the support, mandating
and orchestration of rules of engagement, credentialing,
incentivising and market-defining. Arguably, zones can
thus be seen as precursors to sectors or part of ‘sectori-
sation’ processes in which governance actors, amongst
others, are involved (for example, in what sense is there
a ‘regenerative medicine industry’ or a ‘tissue engineer-
ing industry’ that competitive state institutions and
industry actors can orient themselves to?). Distributed
innovation systems in the era of open innovation do not
correspond with traditional national or even sectoral
boundaries. There is competition and collaboration at a
global level in which national and regional strategies are
paramount, as seen in the foregoing sections. In seeking
preconditions of newly emergent sectors, the conceptual
and empirical project here dovetails with research pro-
blems identified from the evolutionary economics/
science & technology policy research tradition on ‘tech-
nological paradigms’: ‘Finding paradigms after they have
become established seems to be reasonably easy. But
how to catch them as they form, and manage the forma-
tion and establishment of new ones, remain very poorly
understood and under-researched.’ [96]. The concept of
technological zone thus responds to the ecological meta-
phor and offers a number of advantages, in certain
cases, over kindred notions such as industrial sector and
technoscientific innovation network (discussed else-
where: [82]), in approaching this ‘how to catch them as
they form’ problem.
There has been a tendency in innovation/governance
studies to assume that innovation precedes regulation,
but we take it that this dynamic varies by scientific-
technological zone or sector, as suggested by the STS
analyses described here, requiring elaboration through
empirical case study. Thus there are examples of emer-
ging zones where regulation has preceded the appear-
ance of products (e.g. gene therapy) and where the early
product emergence and development of regulation have
been more or less simultaneous (e.g. tissue engineered
products). The open-ended nature of scientific and tech-
nological development means that matters such as the
legal definition of a technology within a given jurisdic-
tion are often left open-ended in newly formulated
legislation.
In order to articulate the broad view illustrated here
that governance is a constructive process shaping the
emergence of new bio-objects, and in part being shaped
by technology innovation and potential markets (as well
as being an external, steering and controlling force) we
have proposed elsewhere the concept of ‘governation’
(governance + innovation, see [82]). Like ‘co-production’,
the term hides more than it reveals, its main purpose
being to highlight a range of mutually-constituting
forces which require detailed case study, such as may be
provided by the emerging strands of biomedical science
and technology in the global, and particularly the Rising
Powers context. Many of these substantive forces that
constitute the co-producing, multiple dimensions of
science, society and the market in the biomedical gov-
ernance field have been identified, by way of illustration,
in the foregoing sections of this discussion.
Conclusions: the conceptual challenge for global
biomedical innovation-governance
To recap the political economy perspective, it is a state’s
ability to respond to global opportunities and the fre-
quently transnational nature of technological innovation,
rather than the coherence of its inward looking policies,
that provides the key to its likely position in the biome-
dical future and its chances of improving its global geo-
political position. Contemporary knowledge economies
are invariably global and this is reflected in the transna-
tional movement of the scientific and financial capital
that fuel them. More so than ever, no state can afford to
be a political island. Increasingly it is the production of
policies that facilitate an advantageous engagement with
global forces that will determine a state’s effectiveness in
innovative fields such as biomedicine, not the pursuit of
protective policies that are bound to be undermined by
the growing presence of international economic govern-
ance. Successful geopolitical manoeuvring by states is
more likely to be characterised by the constructive use
of permeable borders than the rigid application of sover-
eign jurisdiction.
Indeed, it is one of the signal lessons of globalisation
that the permeability of state boundaries can be turned
to a state’s geopolitical advantage. In their review of the
opportunities for biotech companies in two Rising
Powers countries, India and China, Goodall and collea-
gues remark on the possibility that China and India are
opening up a new model of biotech development: ‘Call
it the “modular model”, a kind of decentralised R & D
system where different aspects of R & D are distributed
globally and conducted almost autonomously in differ-
ent locations’ [97]. Because their innovation needs are
different from those of the competition states of the
West, China and India will inevitably push the dynamic
of globalisation in directions that suit their interests and
their particular strategies on the knowledge production
process. In the case of biomedical innovation, there are
already strong indications that both countries will play
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to their knowledge production strengths in terms of the
availability of research materials (e.g. oocytes - [98]), a
large and diverse pool of human subjects for clinical
experimentation (clinical labour), and inexpensive scien-
tific labour. In return they will want to obtain such
advantages as access to the basic science in the field, a
division of the patenting benefits, and a sustained supply
of venture capital. At the same time we can expect that
their strategies on the emerging governance of biomedi-
cal innovation through such mechanisms as TRIPS and
international ethical guidelines will become considerably
more proactive.
Concepts of the inter-linked, co-producing ecology of
innovation and governance processes emphasise the per-
meability of state boundaries and the multidimensional,
multi-sited, multi-scalar nature of innovation-governance
in global biomedicine. This paper has provided an over-
view of a range of approaches to understanding issues
of innovation and governance, which can be applied to
the case of global biomedical innovation. We have
pointed out how particular insights from this range of
approaches are relevant to global biomedical innovation,
and suggested some of the lines of convergence and
complementarity between the somewhat disparate social
science approaches. The challenge now is to further
develop approaches to the issue of the Rising Powers’
entry into the globalising biomedical political economy
that take these convergences further, to combine analy-
sis of politico-economic states’ competitive interests and
strategies with an analysis of the dynamics of, and the
steerage or ‘modulation’ [99] of, emerging international
scientific-technological zones and sectors, taking
account of both public governmental and private regula-
tory possibilities.
To summarise and bring together the threads of our
concept-mapping project, we return to our ‘triangle of
tensions’ as a heuristic to describe the main broad
dimensions of biomedical governance. Combining the
triangle of governance arenas (science, society and the
market), levels of governance (transnational, national
and sub-national) and modes of governance (public and
private) produces a multi-dimensional framework for
the analysis of biomedical innovation (Table 1). We do
not attempt here to fill in each cell, though some exam-
ples can be given. Thus, a transnational private govern-
ance actor in the ‘science’ dimension is the International
Conference on Harmonisation (ICH, the global pharma-
ceutical regulatory body); national-level public govern-
ance actors in the ‘society’ dimension are, for example,
the UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(HFEA), or the National Bioethics Committee of India.
This multi-dimensional framework can move towards
enabling a description of the task of governing a set of
interlinking national and transnational markets that
together constitute the dynamic of knowledge produc-
tion: the funding market of scientific research, the scien-
tific labour market, the moral economy of ethics for the
trading of regulatory values [100], the intellectual prop-
erty market and the financial venture capital market -
all energised also by the political competition. Change
in one market is likely to impact on another thus gener-
ating a need for a self-sustaining system of multi-dimen-
sional governance that has both a stable core capacity at
transnational and state levels and the ability to flex and
evolve its own mechanisms, particularly through the
invention of networked private governance.
This paper suggests that the future further develop-
ment of the framework should meet a number of cri-
teria that include:
1. An analysis of how governance of particular sec-
tors, zones, scientific fields or technologies (in other
words, the issues discussed in the last two sections
of this paper, on Ecologies and Co-production)
articulate with the multidimensional framework of
the political economy of transnational and national
innovation-governance profiles, and application of
this analysis to particular emerging subsectors of
biomedicine, such as stem cell research, tissue engi-
neering, molecular diagnostics and stratified/perso-
nalised medicine;
2. Recognition of the current global balance of
power in biomedical innovation characterised by a
US hegemony and an emerging challenge from the
Rising Powers;
3. Incorporation of data on the emerging innovation
activity of the Rising Powers actors (e.g. the mobili-
sation of human expertise and material resources),
and of the dynamic relationships between the Rising
Powers and other global innovation and governance
actors, both state and non-state;
4. The contribution of the historical trajectory of pri-
vate and public innovation and governance institu-
tions, in the national, sectoral and technological
zone context;
5. The significance of sociocultural and ethical issues
and actors impinging on and shaping innovation and
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governance processes, including civil society groups
and the representation of ethical interests, and acting
at different governance levels;
6. Issues of how ‘demand’ for knowledge and pro-
ducts, and the construction of ‘need’ and clinical
usership in health systems and health economies are
addressed by states with varying strategies for acces-
sing value chains through known markets or new
market-building;
7. The impact of path-shaping expectations and
institution formation between biomedicine producers
(firms, academia) and users (healthcare systems,
patients) and governments’ strategic involvement in
them, involving both competitive and collaborative
dimensions;
8. And the need to identify points and arenas of
potential intervention, negotiation and conflict
between the Rising Powers and other states in the
different levels and nodes of the transnational gov-
ernance of biomedical innovation, both public and
private.
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge the support of the UK’s ESRC award RES-075-25-
0006 in its ‘Rising Powers’ programme.
Authors’ contributions
The paper was conceived jointly by BS and AF. BS primarily wrote sections
1-4, AF primarily wrote sections 5-6. BS and AF co-wrote the Introduction
and Conclusion. AF revised the paper. All authors read and approved the
final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 9 October 2010 Accepted: 24 February 2011
Published: 24 February 2011
References
1. Hogarth S, Salter B: Regenerative medicine in Europe: global competition
and innovation governance. Regenerative Medicine 2010, 5(6):971-85.
2. Cerny P: Paradoxes of the competition state: the dynamics of political
globalisation. Government and Opposition 1997, 32(2):251-74.
3. Hay C: Re-stating politics, re-politicising the state: neo-liberalism,
economic imperatives and the rise of the competition state. Political
Quarterly 2004, 75(1):38-50.
4. Hirsch J: From the Fordist to the post-Fordist state. In The politics of
flexibility: restructuring state and industry in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia.
Edited by: Jessop B. Edward Elgar, Aldershot; 1991.
5. Jessop B: The future of the capitalist state Polity Press, Oxford; 2002.
6. Messner D: The network society: economic development and international
competitiveness as problems of social governance Frank Cass, London; 1997.
7. Pierre J, (ed): Debating governance Oxford University Press, Oxford; 2000.
8. Asheim BT, Gertler MS: The geography of innovation: regional innovation
systems. In The Oxford handbook of innovation. Edited by: Fagerberg J,
Mowery DC, Nelson RR. Oxford University Press, Oxford; 2004.
9. Cooke P: The evolution of biotechnology in three continents:
Schumpeterian or Penrosian? European Planning Studies 2003,
11(7):757-63, (Editorial).
10. Cooke P: Regional knowledge capabilities, embeddedness of firms and
industry organisation: bioscience megacentres and economic
geography. European Planning Studies 2004, 11(7):625-41.
11. Hart D: Private technological capabilities as products of national
innovation systems: four ways of looking at the state. Science and Public
Policy 2002, 29(3):181-88.
12. Hansen A: Biotechnology regulation: limiting or contributing to biotech
development? New Genetics and Society 2001, 20(3):255-71.
13. Laredo P, Mustar P: General conclusion: three major trends in research
and innovation policies. In Research and innovation policies in the global
economy: an international comparative perspective. Edited by: Laredo P and
Mustar P. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham; 2001.
14. Applebaum RP, Henderson J, (eds): States and development in the Asian
Pacific Rim Newbury Park CA, Sage; 1992.
15. Hawes G, Liu H: Explaining the dynamics of the southeast Asian political
economy: state, society and the search for economic growth. World
Politics 1993, 45(4):629-60.
16. Onis Z: The logic of the developmental state. Comparative Politics 1991,
24(1):109-26.
17. Johnson C: MITI and the Japanese miracle Stanford University Press,
Stanford; 1982.
18. Wade R: What strategies are viable for developing countries today? The
World Trade Organisation and the shrinking of ‘development space.
Review of International Political Economy 2003, 10(4):621-44.
19. Weiss L: Developmental states in transition: adapting, dismantling,
innovating, not ‘normalising’. The Pacific Review 2000, 13(1):21-55, 29.
20. Mann M: Has globalisation ended the rise and rise of the nation state?
Review of International Political Economy 1997, 4(3):472-96.
21. Weiss L: The myth of the powerless state Cornell University Press, Ithaca;
1998.
22. Kim YT: Neoliberalism and the decline of the developmental state.
Journal of Contemporary Asia 1999, 29(4):441-62.
23. Wu Y: Rethinking the Taiwanese developmental state. The China Quarterly
2004, 177:91-114.
24. Wong J: Re-making the developmental state in Taiwan: the challenges
of biotechnology. International Political Science Review 2005, 26:169-191.
25. Salter B, Salter C: Governing innovation in the biomedicine knowledge
economy: stem cell science in the USA. Science and Public Policy 2010,
37(2):87-100.
26. Jasanoff S: States of knowledge: co-production of science and social order
Routledge, London; 2004.
27. Hooghe L, Marks G: Unravelling the central state, but how? Types of
multi-level governance. American Political Science Review 2003, 97:233-43.
28. Büthe T: Governance through private authority? Non-state actors in
world politics. Journal of International Affairs 2004, 58:281-90.
29. Knill C, Lehmkuhl D: Private actors and the state: internationalisation and
changing patterns of governance. Governance 2002, 15(1):41-63.
30. Hodge G, Coghill K: Accountability in the privatized state. Governance
2007, 20(4):675-702.
31. Scott C: Private regulation of the public sector: a neglected facet of
contemporary governance. Journal of Law and Society 2002, 29(1):56-76.
32. Tait J, Wield D, Bruce A, Chataway J: Health biotechnology to 2030. OECD
International Futures Project on The bioeconomy to 2030: designing a policy
agenda OECD, Paris; 2007.
33. Coleman WD, Perl E: Internationalised policy environments and policy
network analysis. Political Studies 1999, 47:691-709.
34. Rosenau JN, Czempiel E: Governance without government: order and change
in world politics Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 1992.
35. Young OR: Governance in world affairs Cornell University Press, Ithaca NT;
1999.
36. Etzioni A: Beyond transnational governance. International Journal Autumn;
2001, 595-610.
37. Ronit K, Schneider V: Global governance through private organisations.
Governance 1999, 12(3):243-66.
38. Rosenau JN: Change, complexity and governance in globalising space. In
Understanding governance. Edited by: J Pierre. Oxford University Press,
Oxford; 2000:168-200.
39. Rosenau J: Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization Princeton
University Press, Princeton; 2003.
40. Isasi RM, Knoppers BM: Governing stem cell banks and registries:
Emerging Issues. Stem Cell Research 2009, 3(2-3):96-105.
41. Shorrett P, Rabinow P, Billings PR: The changing norms of the life
sciences. Nature Biotechnology 2003, 21:123-25.
Salter and Faulkner Globalization and Health 2011, 7:3
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/7/1/3
Page 12 of 14
42. Mowery D, Sampat B: The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and university-industry
technology transfer: a model for other OECD governments? The Journal
of Technology Transfer 2004, 30(1-2):115-27.
43. Rai A, Eisenberg R: Bayh-Dole reform and the progress of biomedicine.
Law and Contemporary Problems 2003, 66:289-314.
44. Forero-Pineda C: The impact of stronger intellectual property rights on
science and technology in developing countries. Research Policy 2006,
35:808-24.
45. Salter B: Governing stem cell science in China and India: emerging
economies and the global politics of innovation. New Genetics and Society
2008, 27(2):145-49.
46. Salter B: State strategies and the global knowledge economy: the
geopolitics of regenerative medicine. Geopolitics 2009, 14:1-31.
47. Beeson M: American hegemony and regionalism: the rise of East Asia
and the end of the Asia-Pacific. Geopolitics 2006, 11(4):541-60.
48. Haque MS: Governance and bureaucracy in Singapore: contemporary
reforms and implications. International Political Science Review 2004,
25(2):227.
49. Wong J: The adaptive developmental state in East Asia. Journal of East
Asian Studies 2004, 4:345-62.
50. Lee CS, Schrank A: Incubating Innovation or Cultivating Corruption?: The
Developmental State and the Life Sciences in Asia. Social Forces 2010,
88(3):1231-1255.
51. Minns J: Of miracles and models: the rise and decline of the
developmental state in South Korea. Third World Quarterly 2001,
22(6):1025-43.
52. Saich T: The changing role of government? Background Note for the World
Bank Report on China’s 11th Five Year Plan; 2004 [http://ksghome.harvard.
edu/~asaich/The_Changing_Role_of_Government.pdf].
53. Baum R, Shevchenko A: The state of the state. In The paradox of reform of
China’s post-Mao reforms. Edited by: Goldman M, MacFarquar R. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge MA; 1999.
54. Saich T: Reform and the role of the state in China. In Asian politics in
development. Edited by: Benewick R et al. Frank Cass, London; 2003.
55. Dahlman C, Aubert J: China and the knowledge economy: seizing the 21st
century Washington; World Bank; 2001 [http://info.worldbank.org/etools/
docs/library/137742/ChinaKE.pdf].
56. Chibber V: Locked in place: state building and late industrialisation in India
Princeton University Press, Princeton; 2003.
57. World Bank: India: Five Years of Stabilization and Reform and the Challenges
Ahead New York: World Bank; 1997.
58. Dahlman C, Utz A: India and the knowledge economy: leveraging strengths
and opportunities Washington: World Bank; 2006 [http://info.worldbank.org/
etools/docs/library/145261/India_KE_Overview.pdf].
59. Winters A, Yusuf S: Dancing with giants: China, India and the global economy
Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore; 2007.
60. Salter B: China, globalisation and health biotechnology innovation:
venture capital and the adaptive state. East Asian Science and Technology:
an International Journal 2009, 3(4):401-425.
61. Freeman C: The National System of Innovation in Historical Perspective.
Cambridge Journal of Economics 1995, 19:5-24.
62. Bartholemew S: National systems of biotechnology innovation: complex
interdependence in the global system. Journal of international Business
Studies 1997, 28(2):241-66.
63. Malerba F: New Challenges for Sectoral Systems of Innovation in Europe.
Presented at DRUID Conference on National Innovation Systems, Industrial
Dynamics and Innovation Policy Rebild; 1999.
64. Malerba F: Innovation in sectoral systems: What we know... and what we
would like to know. Presentation to SPRU 40th Anniversary Conference
University of Sussex, UK; 2006.
65. Carlsson B, Stankiewicz R: On the nature, function and composition of
technological systems. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 1991, 1:93-118.
66. Nelson RR, Winter SG: In search of a useful theory of innovation. Research
Policy 1977, 6(1):36-76.
67. Nelson RR, Winter SG: An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change Harvard
University Press, Cambridge MA; 1982.
68. Pavitt K: Sectoral patterns of technical change: towards a taxonomy and
a theory. Research Policy 1984, 13:343-373.
69. Dosi G: Technological paradigms and technological trajectories. A
suggested interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical
change. Research Policy 1982, 11(3):147-162.
70. Leigh Star S: Ecologies of knowledge: work and politics in science and
technology State University of New York Press, Albany; 1995.
71. Greenhalgh T, Robert G, Macfarlane F, Bate P, Kyriakidou O: Diffusion of
innovations in service organizations: Systematic review and
recommendations. Milbank Quarterly 2004, 82:581-629.
72. Metcalfe JS, James A, Mina A: Emergent innovation systems and the
delivery of clinical services: The case of intra-ocular lenses. Research
Policy 2005, 34(9):1283-1304.
73. Ramlogan R, Mina A, Tampubolon G, Metcalfe JS: Networks of knowledge:
The distributed nature of medical innovation. Scientometrics 2007,
70(2):459-89.
74. Ramlogan R, Consoli D: Knowledge, understanding and the dynamics of
medical innovation. Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 2008 [http://mpra.
ub.uni-muenchen.de/9112/1/MPRA_paper_9112.pdf].
75. Livingstone DN: Putting science in its place: geographies of scientific
knowledge University of Chicago Press; 2003.
76. Wainwright SP, Williams C: Spaces of speech and places of performance:
an outline of a geography of science approach to embryonic stem cell
research and diabetes. New Genetics and Society 2008, 27:161-173.
77. van Merkerk RO, van Lente H: Tracing emerging irreversibilities in
emerging technologies: The case of nanotubes. Technological Forecasting
and Social Change 2005, 72(9):1094-111.
78. Rycroft RW, Kash DE: Path Dependence in the Innovation of Complex
Technologies. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 2002,
14(1):21-35.
79. Brown N, Michael M: A Sociology of Expectations: Retrospecting
Prospects and Prospecting Retrospects. Technology Analysis and Strategic
Management 2003, 15(1):3-18.
80. Borup M, Brown N, Konrad K, van Lente H: The Sociology of Expectations
in Science and Technology. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management
2006, 18(3/4):285-298.
81. Geels F, Raven R: Non-linearity and Expectations in Niche-Development
Trajectories: Ups and Downs in Dutch Biogas Development (1973-2003).
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 2006, 18(3/4):375-392.
82. Faulkner A: Medical Technology into Healthcare and Society: a sociology of
devices, innovation, and governance Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke; 2009.
83. Blume S: Insight and Industry: on the dynamics of technological change in
medicine MIT Press; 1992.
84. Metcalfe S, James A, McMeekin A: Distributed Innovation Processes and
the Uneven Growth Of Medical Knowledge. IHT Programme Research
Findings 2004 [http://www.york.ac.uk/res/iht/researchfindings/
MetcalfeFindings.pdf].
85. Oudshoorn N, Pinch TJ: How users matter: the co-construction of users and
technologies MIT Press, Cambridge/London; 2003.
86. Blume S: Lock in, the state and vaccine development: Lessons from the
history of the polio vaccines. Research Policy 2005, 34:159-173.
87. Blume S, Zanders M: Vaccine independence, local competences and
globalisation: Lessons from the history of pertussis vaccines. Social
Science & Medicine 2006, 63:1825-1835.
88. Sassen S: Participation of states and citizens in global governance.
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 2003, 10(1):5-28.
89. Burris S, Drahos B, Shearing C: Nodal Governance. Australian Journal of
Legal Philosophy 2005, 30-58.
90. Swan J, Newell S, Robertson M, Goussevskaia A, Bresnen M: The role of
institutional differences in biomedical innovation processes: a
comparison of the UK and US. International Journal of Healthcare
Technology and Management 2007, 8(3-4):333-53.
91. Faulkner A: Regulatory policy as innovation: constructing rules of
engagement of a technological zone for tissue engineering in the
European Union. Research Policy 2009, 38(4):637-646.
92. Delanty G, Rumford C: Rethinking Europe: social theory and the implications
of Europeanization Routledge, London; 2005.
93. Barry A: Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society The Athlone
Press, London; 2001.
94. Barry A: Technological Zones. European Journal of Social Theory 2006,
9(2):239-253.
95. Callon M: Europe wrestling with technology. Economy and Society 2004,
33(1):121-134, (Review of Barry A: Political Machines, 2001).
96. von Tunzelmann N, Malerba F, Nightingale P, Metcalfe S: Technological
paradigms: past, present and future. Industrial and Corporate Change 2008,
17(3):467-484.
Salter and Faulkner Globalization and Health 2011, 7:3
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/7/1/3
Page 13 of 14
97. Goodall S, Janssens B, Wagner K, Wong J, Woods W, Yeh M: The promise
of the East: India and China as R & D options. Nature Biotecnology 2006,
24(9):1064.
98. Gottweis H, Salter B, Waldby C: The global politics of human embryonic stem
cell science: regenerative medicine in transition Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke; 2009.
99. Rip A: Co-evolution of science, technology and society 2002 [http://www.
sciencepolicystudies.de/dok/expertise-rip.pdf], Accessed April 2010.
100. Salter B, Salter C: Bioethics and the global moral economy: the cultural
politics of human embryonic stem cell science. Science, Technology and
Human Values 2007, 32(5):1-28.
doi:10.1186/1744-8603-7-3
Cite this article as: Salter and Faulkner: State strategies of governance in
biomedical innovation: aligning conceptual approaches for understanding
‘Rising Powers’ in the global context. Globalization and Health 2011 7:3.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color figure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Salter and Faulkner Globalization and Health 2011, 7:3
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/7/1/3
Page 14 of 14
